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ABSTRACT 
 
Subjective Evidence-Based Ethnography (SEBE) is a family of methods developed for investigation 
in social science based on subjective audio-video recordings with a miniature video-camera usually 
worn at eye-level (eye-tracking techniques are included). Despite its application to the analysis of 
high risk professions (e.g. anesthetists, aircraft pilots, nuclear reactor pilots) and the potential 
additional risks it induces, no suggestions regarding these concerns and no solutions helping 
researchers to anticipate this kind of risks are available in the literature. Aiming at filling this gap, we 
undertook a study of SEBE equipment applied to the analysis of workers’ activities on a nuclear 
power plant. The method was divided in three phases: i) observations and discussions on full scale 
simulators of activities undertaken by one or two workers (N=42) to characterize the consequences 
of the SEBE equipment, ii) bibliographic research combined with results of first phase to elaborate a 
risk assessment protocol, iii) analysis of its application in real operating situations (N=17). The 
elaborated protocol gave satisfactory results in terms of risk prevention and time application: No 
incident or accident occurred and the risk assessment took less than five minutes. The observations 
highlighted however a risk of side-effect (using SEBE equipment to justify subjects’ mistake or 
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failure) giving greater importance to the necessity of this sort of risk assessment protocol. To date, 
the protocol needs to be tested in other industrial contexts in order to be improved and/or to confirm 
its robustness. 
 
 
Keywords: Activity analysis; eye tracking; high risk industry; risk assessment; miniaturized camera; 
video. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Using video recordings allows the researcher to 
access to the reality of work activities which is 
one of the major concerns of work analysts. The 
use of video has almost become a necessity 
because it pushes the limits of the classic 
observation paper / pencil: Even with the help of 
analysis grids, the researcher’s writing speed is 
often much slower than the performance of the 
task by observed workers. In addition, taking 
notes entails the risk of not watching the scene 
for a while and so to miss important elements of 
activity. This could be corrected by replaying the 
activity but in the world of work, it is generally 
inappropriate to ask to redo several times the 
activity observed while video allows for multiple 
visualizations retrospectively, very useful in the 
case of complex situations. When the work 
analyst applies self-confrontation, the video 
recording is a main tool: observed subjects 
seeing themselves in action can learn about 
themselves and thus correct or improve 
themselves. Thus, the video is both a source and 
a support: a data source for the researcher and a 
support of expression (body, speech), of 
mediation, which participates in the emergence 
of meaning of the activities and of the co-
production of knowledge through the triangle 
operator-image-researcher [1]. 
 
As noticed by others, video analysis may help 
researchers “to reveal how activities are 
produced with respect to the contingencies and 
circumstances of the participants within 
organizational settings, and examine how the 
technologies available in these domains are 
utilized” [2]. 
 
Amongst all the possible devices available for 
such video recording of activities, the first person 
approach or subjective approach presents the 
particularity to use a recording device embedded 
on the subject in action. The point of view of the 
camera is then that of the subject: this 
characterizes the first person or subjective point 
of view. This kind of approach was 
conceptualized by Lahlou [3,4] under the name 
of Subjective Evidence-Based Ethnography 
(SEBE). The SEBE is thus a family of methods 
developed for investigation in social science 
based on subjective audio-video recordings with 
a miniature video-camera most of the time worn 
at eye-level (the subcam), then confrontation of 
subjects with these subjective recordings to 
collect their subjective experience, and finally 
discussion of findings and final interpretations 
between researchers and subjects. The use of a 
subjective perspective brought interesting series 
of improvements on the quality of the explanation 
by the subject's intentions when rendering in self-
confrontation interview with the subjective videos 
[5]. 
 
The recent progress regarding miniaturized 
cameras and camcorders helps new researchers 
to reach a deeper layer of analysis. For example, 
the consumers’ behavior analysis through 
subjective recordings avoiding disturbance due 
to heavy and bulky equipment was obtained [6,7]. 
Gobbo [8] applied the SEBE approach to shoes 
consumption (videos are available on line: 
ethnoshoes.com). Fauquet-Alekhine et al. [9] 
analyzed consumers’ behavior shopping wines in 
stores for marketing concerns. Similarly, these 
devices allow researchers to access relevant 
data regarding work activity: examples of 
application are available for nuclear industry    
[10-12]. 
 
SEBE also includes eye-tracking systems (see 
the reviews [13,14]). Researchers have used this 
kind of devices to analyze and improve training 
[15-17], to analyze consumers’ behavior [18-20], 
to study high risk professions such as 
anesthetists [21], aircraft pilots [22-24], flight 
fighters [25], air traffic controllers [26], nuclear 
reactor pilots [27]. 
 
The use of SEBE metrology equipment does not 
present any special risks for the subjects 
themselves. Conversely, SEBE equipment 
applied to the analysis of high risk professions 
might induce problems due for example to the 
interaction between the SEBE equipment and the 
work environment (cables may be trapped in the 
industrial equipment) or due to a disturbance of 
subjects’ actions (SEBE glasses might change 
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the subjects’ vision). Despite these potential 
additional risks induced by SEBE equipment, the 
literature is void of suggestion regarding these 
concerns and of solutions helping researchers to 
anticipate subsequent problems.  
 
This paper aims at providing a devoted risk 
assessment for SEBE application for high risk 
professions. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
2.1 Design 
 
The high risk professions chosen to undertake 
this study was the professionals of nuclear 
industry at the nuclear power plant (NPP) of 
Chinon (Electricité de France). The analysis 
frame was bounded by the analysis of their work 
activity (see for example [12]). 
 
A first phase (first observations and discussions) 
was undertaken on simulators to observe and 
discuss with workers (N=42) the consequences 
of the SEBE equipment used. Three kinds of 
professions were observed: Reactor pilot, 
operating field worker, and maintenance 
technician. 
 
A second phase (risk assessment elaboration) 
was related to a bibliographic research regarding 
possible risk assessment protocol in high risk 
industries and to the development of the SEBE 
risk assessment. 
 
A third and final phase (application) consisted in 
applying the elaborated risk assessment of 
phase 2 in real operating situations. Professions 
concerned were the same as for phase 1 but 
subjects (N=17) were other persons. 
 
All studied situations involved one or two 
subjects at the same time in a given work activity. 
These situations were real operating situations 
therefore exposing subjects to interactions with 
the industrial environment in operation and to 
interpersonal contacts with colleagues including 
all constrains induced by their job and by 
interactions with other jobs.    
 
2.2 Subjects 
 
For phase 1, reactor pilots were observed and 
then interviewed in the simulated control room. 
N=30 subjects (age: 25 to 45 yo.; professional 
experience: several months to 13 years) were 
equipped with SEBE equipment whilst evaluating 
safety (individual activity) or dealing with 
periodical tests of the process (collective activity). 
Operating field workers were observed and then 
interviewed in the field simulator. N=10 subjects 
(age: 25 to 45 yo.; professional experience: 
several months to 15 years) were equipped with 
SEBE equipment whilst configuring hydraulic 
circuit (individual or collective activity). 
Maintenance workers were observed and then 
interviewed in one of the tap and valve 
simulators. N=2 subjects (age: 45 yo.; 
professional experience: 20 years) were 
equipped with SEBE equipment whilst working 
with valves and related actuator devices. All 
these activities lasted from several minutes to 2 
hours. All simulators were located at the Training 
Center of the NPP of Chinon. 
 
For phase 3, reactor pilots were observed and 
then interviewed in one of the control rooms. N=5 
subjects (age: 25 to 45 yo.; professional 
experience: several months to 10 years) were 
equipped with SEBE equipment whilst evaluating 
safety (individual activity) or dealing with 
periodical tests of the process (collective activity). 
Operating field workers were observed and then 
interviewed in the field. N=10 subjects (age: 25 
to 35 yo.; professional experience: 1 to 7 years) 
were equipped with SEBE equipment whilst 
configuring electric or hydraulic circuits 
(individual or collaborative activity). Maintenance 
workers were observed and then interviewed in 
one of the electric premises. N=2 subjects (age: 
28 and 40 yo.; professional experience: 5 and 15 
years resp.) were equipped with SEBE 
equipment whilst undertaking the test of a part of 
the control system of the installation. All these 
activities lasted from several minutes to 3 hours 
and took place at the NPP of Chinon. 
 
As the aim was to develop a SEBE risk 
assessment for anyone of the staff, gender, age 
and experience were not considered as variables 
to be analyzed, yet subjects were chosen so that 
a large range of age and work experience could 
be represented by the sample. 
 
2.3 Apparatus 
 
All simulators were of full scale type, reproducing 
with a high degree of fidelity the real operating 
material and environment of a NPP, as well as 
the real kinetic of physical parameters. 
 
The SEBE equipment was made up of three 
parts linked with cables: i) a micro audio digital 
recorder DVR-500-HD2 self powered by internal 
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batteries, ii) a 4 mm diameter - 40 mm length 
miniaturized subcam mounted on safety glasses, 
iii) a lavaliere microphone. This SEBE equipment 
was purchased at Active Media Concept. 
 
Reactor pilots were dressed with their own civil 
garments. Other professionals wore individual 
safety equipment including overalls, helmet, 
shoes and gloves if needed. 
 
2.4 Procedure 
 
Phases 1 (first observations and discussions) 
and 3 (application) required a prior discussion 
with the management of the teams (operating 
and training) in order to present the study, 
negotiate hierarchical agreement, and identify 
the possible subjects and activities. Then a 
preparation was undertaken with the subject(s) in 
order to explain the aim of the research, discuss 
of agreement and sign the ethical form. Only for 
phase 3, the preparation included the application 
of the SEBE risk assessment protocol elaborated 
in phase 2. After equipping the subject(s), work 
activity was engaged by the subjects and / 
researchers began making observations using 
pencil and paper. No particular instruction was 
given to subjects: They just had to perform their 
task as usual. Observations focused on 
interactions of the SEBE equipment with the 
environment and subjects. Immediately after the 
end of the time planed for the experimentation, a 
semi-structured interview was carried out by the 
researchers with the subject(s). Questions were 
asked regarding subjects’ perception of their own 
safety and comfort whilst wearing SEBE 
equipment, their ability to act, to perform the task, 
constrains induced by the SEBE equipment on 
their activity, the interaction between the SEBE 
equipment and their garments or the industrial 
equipment. A final open question left place for 
additional comments. The difference between 
phase 1 and phase 2 lied in the final interview: 
for phase 1, the goal was to explore the risks, for 
the phase 2, the goal was to complement the 
protocol. 
 
Phase 2 (risk assessment elaboration) began 
with a list of potential risks due to the SEBE 
equipment elaborated from the material obtained 
in phase 1, also fostered by feedback from 
others studies [3,11,28,29]. These risks were 
then categorized in order to identify families of 
potential risks. It was here assumed that risks of 
a given family could be identified by the same set 
of questions. In these conditions, it would make 
the risk assessment more concise. 
In parallel, a bibliographic research was 
undertaken to explore the risk assessment in 
high risk industries. Four industries were 
considered: Nuclear, aerospace, airline, and 
medicine. The investigation focused on available 
approaches, methods and protocols of risk 
assessment of work activity in order to adapt it in 
the case of the SEBE use.   
 
3. RESULTS  
 
3.1 Results of Observations, Interviewers 
(Phase 1) and Additional Feedback 
 
The first observations from the researchers as 
well as the first remarks from the subjects 
concerned the interaction of the SEBE 
equipment with their body and with their worn 
equipment: these resulted in comments (positive 
or negative) regarding the SEBE glasses over 
their own glasses, the way they had to adjust 
their own glasses whilst working (one of the pilot 
was used to pushing back his glasses on the 
nose (a tic) and another was used to pushing his 
glasses up on his front when reading certain 
indicators of the control panel). This led us to 
consider other possible interactions with 
prostheses (hearing aid, lenses) and to question 
the relevancy and the adjustment of the 
positioning of the SEBE equipment on the 
subjects. 
 
The operating field workers were wearing 
overalls with a lot of pockets and a lot of things 
inside. These led us to question the possible 
interaction between these objects and SEBE 
equipment, especially with the cables. As a 
consequence, the reliability of their movements, 
of their actions, as well as of their speed of action 
was questioned. Observations pointed out 
possible interactions between the SEBE 
equipment (especially the cables) and the 
industrial equipment in the case of operating field 
worker and maintenance worker. 
 
Finally, it appeared important to remind to the 
subjects that the most important was to perform 
their work activity and that, in case of discomfort 
due to the SEBE equipment, this latter had to be 
taken away at once. 
 
3.2 Results of the Risk Assessment 
Elaboration (Phase 2) 
 
The results of phase 1 led to a questionnaire for 
risk assessment divided in 5 categories 
addressing a specific field of the experiment for 
work activity:  
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• Usual biotechnical constraints (including 
concerns about  individual's safety and 
comfort), 
• Biotechnical constraints of the activity, 
• Performance constraints, 
• Equipment safety, 
• Induced biotechnical constraints (including 
concerns about individual's safety and 
comfort). 
 
Each category was then broken down into 
several questions: 
 
1-Usual biotechnical constraints 
1.1-Do you wear a hearing aid? 
1.2-Do you wear lenses? 
1.3-Do you wear glasses? 
1.4-If Yes to any of the questions, is this 
resulting in particular regular manipulations?  
 
2-Biotechnical constraints of the activity 
2.1-Do you wear equipment that may interact 
with the SEBE equipment? (e.g. belt 
metrology, helmet, ear plugs, prostheses) 
 
3-Performance constraints 
3.1-Can SEBE metrology reduce the reliability 
of your movements? 
3.2-Can SEBE metrology reduce the speed of 
your movements? 
3.3-Can SEBE metrology mechanically interact 
with your work environment, causing 
damage? (e.g. span, crawl, slip, climb) 
 
4-Equipment safety 
4.1-Could SEBE Metrology be damaged? 
4.2-Could SEBE Metrology be infected, 
contaminated?  
 
5-Induced biotechnical constraints (once SEBE 
metrology in place). Do you feel a 
particular discomfort for: 
 
5.1-The field of vision? 
5.2-Listening? 
5.3-The weight of the glasses? 
5.4-The placement of the camcorder? 
5.5-The placement of cables? 
5.6-The length of the cables? 
 
A final reminder was added: The reminder was 
that the priority is the work activity carried out by 
the workers. In case of discomfort felt by workers 
due to SEBE equipment, workers must request 
its immediate withdrawal. 
 
The bibliographic research undertaken to explore 
the risk assessment in four high risk industries 
(§2.4) gave relevant results from nuclear and 
aerospace industries.  
 
The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 
highlighted the necessity to have constant risk 
assessment: “Nuclear safety undergoes constant 
examination” is one of the 8 principles of a strong 
nuclear safety culture [30]. “Insights from 
probabilistic risk assessments are considered in 
daily work activities and change processes” [31] 
promoting constant examination. This means that 
risk assessment is more than one examination: 
the risk assessment must be undertaken every 
time performing the activities as the context 
and/or the actors are always new. For the SEBE, 
we applied this as the necessity to perform a 
systematic risk assessment before each 
application, even if we had the same subject 
and/or the same activity. 
 
The International Atomic Energy Association 
(IAEA) provided a probabilistic approach of risks 
and promoted a method for risk assessment 
based on consequences and frequency (Fig. 1):  
 
The process of quantified risk assessment is 
probabilistic in nature. It recognizes that 
accidents are rare and that possible events 
and risks cannot be entirely eliminated. 
Because major accidents may or may not 
occur over the entire life of a plant or a 
process, it is not appropriate to base the 
assessment process on the consequences of 
accidents in isolation. The probability of this 
kind of accidents actually occurring should 
be taken into account. [32].  
 
To operate this approach concretely, we applied 
the risk assessment matrix of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
[33], in full agreement with the recommendations 
of IAEA, simple and quite clear. In this approach, 
coherent with most of those applied in high risk 
industries since the work of Farmer [34], gravity 
is evaluated in terms of consequences. The 
matrix approach is a cross assessment of the 
probability and consequences which are both 
rated on a five step scale:  
 
Very low, low, moderate, high, very high 
 
The definition of the steps is given in the Tables 1 
and 2. They are presented according to four 
domains: Safety, technical, cost, schedule. 
 
For example, in Table 1, it is suggested that a 
given space program may be concerned by very 
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high risks if an identified risk has a probability to 
occur during the program greater than 10-1 
(safety domain) or if the probability not to meet 
the expected performance is greater than 50% 
(technical domain) or if the probability of an over 
cost is greater than 75%. 
 
Regarding the safety concern, as done by 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for high 
risks industries, we considered probability as a 
frequency related to the experiment. Yet, the 
PRA of NASA as well as of INPO considered the 
probability of occurrence related to a whole 
space mission or a whole industrial unit operation 
of which scale of assessment may be several 
hours, weeks, months or years [32]. Regarding 
our experiment, we were interested in the impact 
of wearing the SEBE equipment. This was a 
permanent situation and we considered that the 
appropriate scale of assessment was the second. 
This led to the following association in Table 3. 
 
Risks were then assessed in the 5x5 matrix 
according to Fig. 2. 
 
The global aim of a risk assessment is to identify 
risks for the activity and then implement remedial 
measures to reduce risks and return all of them 
in the green area (bottom left corner) of the 5x5 
matrix if possible. 
 
On Fig. 2, we adopted a nomenclature to 
designate: 
 
• probability: p (in subscript on Fig. 2) 
• consequence: c (in subscript on Fig. 2) 
• very low, low, moderate, high, very high: 
VL, L, M, H, VH 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of quantitative risk assessment procedure. Adapted from IAEA [32] 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Risk assessment in the 5x5 matrix Probability vs Consequence characterization 
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Table 1. Definition of the five steps scale for probability. Adapted from Alcom et al. [33] 
 
Probability Safety (estimated 
probability of safety 
event occurrence) 
Technical (estimated 
probability of not 
meeting 
performance)  
Cost/Schedule 
(estimated probability of 
not meeting cost or 
schedule commitment) 
VH: Very High ps > 10-1 pT > 50% pCS > 75% 
H: High 10-2 < ps ≤ 10-1 25% < pT ≤ 50% 50% < pCS ≤ 75% 
M: Moderate 10-3 < ps ≤ 10-2 15% < pT ≤ 25% 25% < pCS ≤ 50% 
L: Low 10-6 < ps ≤ 10-3 2% < pT ≤ 15% 10% < pCS ≤ 25% 
VL: Very Low ps ≤ 10-6 0.1% < pT ≤ 2% pCS ≤ 10% 
 
Table 2. Definition of the five steps scale for consequences. Adapted from Alcom et al. [33] 
 
Risk VL: Very 
Low 
L: Low M: Moderate H: High VH: Very High 
Safety Negligible or 
No impact. 
Could cause the 
need for only 
minor first aid 
treatment. 
May cause 
minor injury or 
occupational 
illness or minor 
property 
damage. 
May cause 
severe injury or 
occupational 
illness or major 
property 
damage. 
May cause 
death or 
permanently 
disabling injury 
or destruction of 
property. 
Technical No impact to 
full mission 
success 
criteria. 
Minor impact to 
full mission 
success criteria. 
Moderate 
impact to full 
mission 
success criteria. 
Minimum 
mission 
success criteria 
is achievable 
with margin. 
Major impact to 
full mission 
success 
criteria. 
Minimum 
mission 
success criteria 
is achievable. 
Minimum 
mission 
success criteria 
is not 
achievable. 
Schedule Negligible or 
no schedule 
impact. 
Minor impact to 
schedule 
milestones; 
accommodates 
within reserves; 
no impact to 
critical path. 
Impact to 
schedule 
milestones; 
accommodates 
within reserves; 
moderate 
impact. to 
critical path. 
Major impact to 
schedule 
milestones; 
major impact to 
critical path. 
Cannot meet 
schedule and 
program 
milestones. 
Cost <2% 
increase 
over 
allocated 
and 
negligible 
impact on 
reserve. 
Between 2% 
and 5% 
increase over 
allocated and 
can handle with 
reserve. 
Between 5% 
and 7% 
increase over 
allocated and 
cannot handle 
with reserve. 
Between 7% 
and 10% 
increase over 
allocated, 
and/or exceeds 
proper 
reserves. 
>10% increase 
over allocated, 
and/or can’t 
handle with 
reserves. 
 
The definition of the steps is given Tables 1 and 
2. They are presented according to four domains: 
Safety, technical, cost, schedule. Regarding the 
SEBE method, cost and schedule are not 
impacted domains provided that the SEBE 
equipment is not destroyed. This issue is 
addressed through the technical domain. Hence, 
the protocol we elaborated below examined 
points from the safety and technical standpoints 
only. Therefore, each question related to the five 
categories of risks listed in section 3.2 gave rise 
to an assessment according to safety and 
performance domain, concretely achieved 
through an assessment form presented in Figs. 3 
and 4 as an example for question 1.1 of the 
SEBE risk assessment protocol. 
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These forms (Figs. 3 and 4) were completed at 
the beginning of the document by an introduction 
sheet explaining briefly how to apply the 
document and by three summarizing grids at the 
end of the document, each one related to the 
type of risks (red in upper right corner, green in 
bottom left corner, yellow in the middle, in the 
matrix Fig. 1).  
 
Table 3. Appropriate scale of assessment for 
safety probability or likelihood 
 
Probability Frequency 
10-1 1/10 sec 
10-2 ½ min 
10-3 1/15 min 
10-6 1/10 j 
 
The introduction sheet reminds the user the color 
code associated to the risk level and what is an 
acceptable risk according to the matrix. It also 
presents a Table on which the designation of the 
activity studied and the names of the performers 
must be written by the analyst as well as the date 
of the risk assessment and the participants’ 
names, complemented by the time and date of 
the activity performance and the performers’ 
names. This information is important because it 
helps the analyst to prove that people performing 
the task were involved in the risk assessment. 
The Table also offers the possibility to write down 
the number of conclusions identified during the 
risk assessment. This information is relevant as it 
helps analysts and workers to know whether or 
not they have something to do to minimize the 
risks by a quick look in case of activity realized 
later than the time of the risk assessment: If the 
number of conclusions is “0”, no significant risk 
was identified; otherwise the summarizing grids 
at the end of the document must be read. On 
these grids, the analyst writes the number of the 
questions concerned by a risk identified, for 
which domain (safety and/or technical) and what 
must be done. 
 
3.3 Application of the SEBE Risk 
Assessment in Real Operating 
Situations (Phase 3) 
 
The whole document obtained was thus made up 
of thirty-four pages (available for free on line at 
http://www.hayka-kultura.org/larsen.html). Using 
this document for SEBE risk assessment implies 
beginning by filling the Table on the introduction 
sheet. This was achieved during the preparation 
phase with the subject(s) just before performing 
the work activity. Then, turning the page, the first 
question 1.1 (Fig. 3) was asked to the subject(s) 
regarding safety domain and in case of answer 
“YES”, consequence was identified clearly and 
written in the box “1” under “consequence”, then 
characterized and probability evaluated. In case 
of several consequences, box “2” and “3” could 
be used. The pairs (characterization; probability) 
were then drawn on the matrix writing “1” for 
consequence #1 and so on. In case of ticking 
inside the yellow or red area, remedial had to be 
written in the next box. Then the next page was 
considered (Fig. 4), asking the same question 
1.1 from the performance standpoint, and a 
similar analysis was carried out. This was then 
done for the next questions. In case of answer 
“NO”, the page was turned without any comment. 
 
At the end of the document, all identified 
consequences were summarized in the last three 
summarizing grids and the total number of 
consequences identified and reported in the grids 
was noted on the introduction sheet. Doing so, it 
was easy to consult the document later and know 
how many risks and remedial were identified and 
not forget any of them. 
 
Application of the SEBE risk assessment 
document with workers in real operating situation 
was indeed easy and quick. Most of the answers 
to the questions were negative and the protocol 
was applied in less than five minutes. 
 
There was a recurrent positive answer to 
question #3.3: “Can SEBE metrology 
mechanically interact with your work environment, 
causing damage?” for the operating field workers 
and maintenance workers. The systematic 
remedial action was to run the SEBE metrology 
cables inside the overalls.  
 
There were no cases of subjects equipped with a 
hearing aid. No case of possible infection or 
contamination of the SEBE metrology equipment 
was encountered. 
 
Only one case of discomfort was reported 
(questions of category #5) not during the risk 
assessment but during the interview after 
performing the activity. The subject was a reactor 
pilot.  
 
No case led to withdrawing the SEBE metrology 
equipment. 
 
No incident or accident was observed or reported.  
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Fig. 3. SEBE risk assessment form for question 1.1 related to safety domain 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. SEBE risk assessment form for question 1.1 related to performance domain 
characterization 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Contribution 
 
When obtaining the SEBE risk assessment 
protocol after phase 2, a worry came to our mind 
regarding the time which would be necessary to 
apply it: Usually, additional tasks are never 
welcome in the course of industrial activities 
because they reduce efficiency by increasing the 
time of work. We were pleased to demonstrate 
finally that this did not take more than about 5 
minutes. 
 
The fact that no problem was encountered and 
just one complaint was reported by the subjects 
whilst applying the SEBE equipment with prior 
risk assessment in real operating situations is 
encouraging: It suggests that the developed 
protocol for SEBE risk assessment may be a 
relevant tool. Problem due to the dimensions of 
the device would perhaps have been different 
with a bigger camera, especially for field workers 
in narrow premises. 
 
The complaint regarding SEBE equipment 
concerned just one case of discomfort reported 
during the interview after performing the activity 
(1 subject over 17 in the application phase 3). 
The subject was a student reactor pilot. However, 
observations led to the assumption that this 
person was using any reason to justify his 
difficulties in achieving the tasks (lack of 
competencies). Yet, due to ethical concerns, this 
point could not be discussed neither with his 
managers nor with his colleagues for 
confirmation or not. This highlighted a very 
important point: if an individual may attempt to 
hide a kind of lack of competencies by invoking 
the effect of the SEBE equipment, we may 
assume that, in case of accident occurring in 
situation, the SEBE equipment might be 
designated by the subjects as a main factor 
contributing to the accident even though it would 
not be really the case. This finding gives even 
greater importance to the necessity of this sort of 
risk assessment protocol. Indeed, in case of the 
occurrence of an accident whilst using the SEBE 
equipment with risk assessment beforehand, 
there are arguments to defend the absence of 
contribution of the SEBE equipment to the 
accident. Obviously, this does not prevent the 
workers to make by their side the risk analysis of 
their own activity. 
 
This protocol may be applied to any kind of 
SEBE, including wireless devices or systems for 
which the camcorder and/or the microphone are 
integrated inside the glasses: In these cases, the 
related questions are merely not applicable. 
 
4.2 Quantitative Approach 
 
Risk assessment addressing SEBE use is quite 
new and therefore suffers of a lack of experience 
feedback on the contrary of space programs or 
nuclear reactors operation. A long experience 
feedback helps analysts to make the risk 
assessment more accurate by fostering 
probability data with the frequency of event 
occurrences. For example, the repetitive failure 
of a given sensor m times over a ten year space 
program including M launches of a rocket 
equipped with this sensor helps analysts to 
adjust the probability of failure of this sensor to 
m/M. The SEBE unfortunately does not have any 
benefits of this kind as it has never been 
considered from such a standpoint until today. 
Nevertheless, from the N=42 cases used to 
elaborate the protocol and then from the N=17 
cases for application, we may conclude that the 
thresholds suggested by the NASA to bound the 
technical levels (Table 1) and that the thresholds 
selected to bound the safety levels (Table 3) are 
appropriate: indeed, applications in working 
situations led us to implement remedial actions 
that avoided any problem in the considered 
industrial domain. For example, while the 
placement of the cables was not pointed out as 
inducing a possible difficulty for reactor pilots, 
this was not the case for field workers for whom 
keeping the cables inside the vest was 
recommended. 
 
4.3 Limits 
 
Despite the fact that results of the present study 
suggest that the developed protocol for SEBE 
risk assessment may be a relevant tool, the 
application as well as the exploratory phase 
preceding the elaboration of the protocol 
concerned only one industrial field. Furthermore, 
no particular biotechnical constraint was met 
except wearing glasses: it should be interesting 
to deal with subjects concerned by prostheses. 
The same for equipment safety with infection or 
contamination. It would be worth to test the 
application of the protocol in context of other high 
risk industries in order to submit it to other fields 
of constraints and test its robustness and learn 
whether or not the protocol needs improvement 
and complements. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
A protocol for risk assessment regarding the 
application of SEBE metrology equipment was 
validated for work activities in nuclear power 
plant. This protocol was based on the 
recommendations and applications of the 
International Atomic Energy Association, the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
 
The protocol gave satisfactory results in terms of 
risk prevention and time duration application. We 
found important to add a reminder in the protocol 
document for the subjects not to forget that the 
priority remains the work activity carried out by 
them. In case of feeling any discomfort due to 
SEBE equipment, they must request its 
immediate withdrawal. Furthermore, recommend-
dations of INPO (§ 3.2) led us to highlight the 
necessity to perform a systematic risk 
assessment before each application, even if we 
had the same subject and/or the same activity. 
 
The observations highlighted however a risk of 
side-effect: Workers who are not at ease in their 
job due to lack of skills might say that the SEBE 
equipment was disturbing them to justify a 
problem and not to accept their own 
responsibilities; moreover, in case of an accident, 
SEBE metrology equipment could be accused as 
disturbing workers even though it was not the 
case. These findings gave greater importance to 
the necessity of this sort of risk assessment 
protocol. 
 
This protocol may be applied to any kind of 
SEBE, including wireless devices or systems 
with integrated camcorder and/or the microphone 
inside the glasses. Yet, the protocol needs to be 
tested in other industrial contexts in order to be 
improved and/or to confirm its robustness. 
Despite that, the SEBE risk assessment protocol 
we obtained clearly fills a gap with efficiency for 
researchers and analysts using SEBE 
techniques. 
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